INTRODUCTION
Recently, the European Union Court of Justice recognized a socalled right to be forgotten. 1 The right in question was officially declared to be fundamental in character. 2 The contours of this right will doubtlessly evolve, 3 but for the moment Europe recognizes a personal right to ask internet search engine owners to remove links to third party web pages that appear following searches using one's name in the search query. 4 The person requesting the delinking need not show prejudice, or the inaccuracy of the underlying post or web page. 5 Rather, the search engine operator is now legally required to consider whether the third party post or web page is, at the present time, "inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive . . . ." 6 The owner of the search engine in question, 7 in making that crucial determination, must consider "all the circumstances of the case." 8 The general presumption is that the interests of the data subject, or requesting party, should override "not only the economic interest of the 
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operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data subject's name." 9 Crucially, though, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.
10
The language of fundamental rights is thus cashed out largely in terms of a straightforward balancing test.
11 In particular, the relevant fair balancing may depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject's private life and on the interest of the public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.
12
Interest in a broad so-called right to be forgotten is not confined to the European Union. 13 Where it is eventually recognized, a presumably fundamental right to be forgotten may actually take different forms, reflecting local cultural differences. The scope of coverage and the strength of such a right are likely to vary as well. Already, the European Union has at least for the moment categorically distinguished between the obligations of search engine operators and those 15 The proper strength of a fundamental right to be forgotten remains controversial even in official European circles. 16 Given the evolving nature of the right to be forgotten, the focus below will not be on specific legal formulas, mechanisms, tests, or procedures. Instead, the focus will be on more basic underlying values, concerns, tendencies, experiences, patterns, risks, and costs. Controversial definitions of ideas such as privacy, autonomy, anonymity, and the public interest will be avoided as much as possible. The focus will instead be more practical. The argument below will rely not on dogmatic assertions about rights, but on a pragmatic sense of the inevitable basic problems in implementing such a right.
In the end, for pragmatic reasons, there should not be an adoption of a broad European-style legal right to be forgotten. Narrowly contextual particularized statutory and common law privacy, non-defamation, confidentiality, and emotional distress damages rightsalong with criminal expungement statutes-jointly provide a better alternative path. Narrowly focused holdings and statutes can readily be modified to address significant socio-economic class effects.
Any broad-sweeping legal right to be forgotten, beyond such narrow, particularized, context-sensitive accommodations, is ultimately likely, for practical reasons discussed throughout below, to be ill-advised. The superiority of a narrow, particularized, contextual, and pluralistic approach to a right to be forgotten flows from practically significant systematic biases and asymmetries between individuals seeking delinking or deletion of personal information on the one hand and information aggregators such as Google on the other. Some preliminary background considerations bearing upon this ultimate conclusion are introduced immediately below. One preliminary problem is that the test of judicial protection for a right to be forgotten does not seem to match the dramatic rhetorical characterization of the right. The right in question has been exalted as a fundamental or human right. 17 Yet the judicial test for upholding or restricting the right to be forgotten thus far seems to involve presumptions and a broad weighing and balancing of arguably relevant interests. 18 Could a genuinely fundamental right really be traded off and overridden in this fashion?
A moment's reflection suggests, though, that rights we have long thought genuinely fundamental can indeed, in various contexts, be substantially limited in the name of the public interest. Consider, for example, the constitutional protection of freedom of speech, and in particular, speech on public streets and thoroughfares. The power of government to restrict speech on public streets, a traditional forum for public discussion, 19 is said to be quite limited. 20 The right to speak in public streets is in this sense basic and well established.
21
A look at the typical purposes of public streets also suggests, however, common sense limitations on the relevant free speech right. At the very least, content neutral regulations of public street speech in the interests of traffic flow, and of safely avoiding distractions, collisions, hazards, and delays, may well be constitutionally permissible.
22
The case of free speech in public streets thus suggests that we should not assume a distinctive problem with a fundamental right to be forgotten that can, in a broad range of contexts, be outweighed 26 The opinion in Melvin is exceptionally moralistic in its language, rationale, and tone. 27 The case involved a movie that relied not merely on presumably scandalous prior incidents somehow preserved in a public record, but on the defendant's use of the plaintiff-appellant's name in connection with those prior incidents, after she had allegedly rehabilitated herself some eight years before the movie in question. 28 The Melvin court thus opined that 
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In broad terms, the Melvin court declared that "[a]ny person living a life of rectitude has that right to happiness which includes a freedom from unnecessary attacks on his character, social standing, or reputation." 30 Only a bit more contextually, the Melvin court then concluded that the publication . . . of the unsavory incidents in the past life of appellant after she had reformed, coupled with her true name, was not justified by any standard of morals or ethics known to us, and was a direct invasion of her inalienable right guaranteed to her by our Constitution, to pursue and obtain happiness. Whether we call this a right of privacy or give it any other name is immaterial . . . .
31
It cannot be said with certainty whether the reasoning of Melvin would extend to serious criminal activity, breaches of trust, public figures, matters of public concern, more recent rehabilitations, or different means of dissemination, including government publications. No issue of the completeness or incompleteness of the plaintiff's rehabilitation arose in Melvin, as the case was decided on the basis of the defendant's motion to dismiss. 32 Based on the broad-sweeping language in Melvin, 33 one might imagine that most or all of these above categories would indeed fall within the scope of Melvin.
Interestingly, though, the court's own initial summary of the law of privacy makes a case for excluding cases of public figures, 34 matters of (continuing) public interest, 35 States case law establishes that disowning one's prior public figure status may not be practical in some cases, and more important for our purposes, will often trigger a fact-sensitive, circumstance-based, contextual inquiry by the court. 39 The passage of time, even along with one's good faith efforts, may not suffice to change one's public figure status, or the nature and weight of any public interest at stake. 40 The themes of incrementalism, particularity, context, and circumstance are more useful in accounting for the scope and limits of the most important contemporary United States privacy statutes. The already more or less contextualized federal Freedom of Information Act, 41 for example, itself has a number of further contextualized exemptions, 42 and these exemptions from disclosure are typically narrowly construed. 43 The narrow construction rule applies even to some of the most privacy-focused Freedom of Information Act cases, 44 if less so to others, 45 depending, again, upon circumstances and the changing weight of the relevant contextualized interests. 46 The similarly contextualized Privacy Act of 1974 also involves numerous thoughtful exemptions, beyond its limited scope of application only to most federal governmental agencies.
47
At the state level, the various arrest and conviction expungement statutes seek-again within discrete, particular, limited contexts-to accommodate certain narrow privacy interests.
48 Expungement statutes promote relatively limited privacy interests in limited contexts, and they can clearly be modified in the future to be more socio-economically just in their impact. United States courts have been unwilling to read anything like a European-style general right to be forgotten into typical criminal expungement statutes. 49 As a leading case concluded, "[a]lthough our expungement statute generally permits a person whose record has been expunged to misrepresent his past, it does not alter the metaphysical truth of his past, nor does it impose a regime of silence on those who know the truth."
50 Doubtless web pages, posts, and search engine results are more cheaply and undetectably revised than are items in paper archives and bound volumes. But as the court in question crucially observed, expungement statutes are "not intended to create an Orwellian scheme, whereby previously published information-long maintained in official records-now becomes beyond the reach of public discourse on penalty of a defamation [or privacy] action." 
II. SOME IMPORTANT PRAGMATIC CONCERNS IN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN CONTEXTS
In some fields of study, carefully defining relevant terms and systematically analyzing those terms and their relationships yields substantial advances in understanding. 52 Unfortunately, in the general context of a purported legal right to be forgotten, this is not likely to be the case. Conceptual analysis, short of a more pragmatic investigation informed by sensible judgments, will only carry us so far.
While privacy rights are often considered fundamental, 53 the idea of privacy itself has proven to be not merely controversial, but enduringly elusive. 54 To illustrate some remarkably basic conceptual uncertainties, consider the claim that: the more one thinks about privacy, the less confident one can be that privacy is a distinctly moral desideratum, as opposed to a largely prudential one, when it is anything more than a matter of a widely shared taste. . . . [O] ur interest in privacy is mainly a matter of taste and prudence. 55 In contrast, the idea of anonymity is used in fewer divergent senses than that of privacy, but it does not seem to be of consistently positive-let alone overridingly positive-value. One scholar argues that anonymity "is not reducible to privacy, liberty and autonomy, security, or secrecy, but is distinguished from them by its hallmark trait of dissociability."
56 Dissociability, in turn, involves the morally ambiguous ability to prevent others from knowing us as we really are, 57 and naturally inspires in us a certain ambivalence. While anonymity 
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can certainly allow us "to protect ourselves in morally permissible ways," 58 as in the case of Alcoholics Anonymous membership, 59 it also "permits a range of moral vices, for it also shields us from accountability for wrongdoing." 60 We naturally have a similar ambivalence about the related idea of concealment. Concealment involves, often positively, "reticence and nonacknowledgement," 61 as well as, and often more negatively, manipulation, and "secrecy and deception." Our understandable ambivalence as to the value of anonymity, self-concealment, and privacy more generally, 63 is however, ultimately based less in definitional and conceptual issues than in important pragmatic concerns and experiences. 64 Mere assertion of a right to privacy "may prevail for a time, but only so long as the benefits that it opposes are small." 65 The most decisive considerations for and against any supposed right to be forgotten are thus, in the long run, more likely to be of a pragmatic, experiential character. 65. Id. Thus, "those who would defend privacy as we know it will have to provide a convincing account of the human good that overshadows the material rewards that are offered in its place. It will not be easy." Id. We should clarify that there is no reason to believe that all of the pragmatic costs of pursuing a right to be forgotten will be material or financial in character. DREXEL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:401
At a pragmatic level, our attitudes toward the value of remembering and forgetting particular life incidents are mixed. 66 We enjoy inspiring stories of those persons who capitalize on an unexpected second chance.
67 But we also value the opportunity to meaningfully inform ourselves about strangers upon whom we might wish to rely, 68 including via a convenient and inexpensive search of internet records. 69 The practical value of such internet records reflects not only their accuracy, but their realistic thoroughness and availability. Some intentional deletions, after all, could unexpectedly turn out to be deceptive, misleading, 70 and costly to perhaps unforeseen persons.
71
The problem of the costs to various other persons of a right to be forgotten remains important. This is true even if the entities making a removal decision take seriously the distinctions between currently relevant information, irrelevant information, or supposedly outdated information, and between matters of ongoing public interest and those that do not thus qualify. 72 As a leading expert rightly observed, "the concepts of relevance and of public interest [ 
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Consider, for example, the inevitable difficulties in trying to assess the continuing relevance of some assumedly accurate item of information. To even begin to guess about such questions, the decision maker would need to know something of the particular contexts and circumstances in which the information in question might, in the future, be sought. Such matters are typically not entirely known even to the party requesting the deletion of the link or web posting in question. The relevant insights, of whatever quality, are instead widely dispersed across time and space, and among many parties, 74 most of whom will have no notice of the removal request and costly alternative access, if any, to the removed information. The crucial problem, though, is not that the information provided by anyone requesting delinking or deletion will commonly be merely "incomplete."
76 That is both inevitable and often subject, at one level or another, to reasonable contest and debate. 77 The more significant problem is that removal and delinking decisions affecting those partly unpredictable future circumstances will commonly be made at the request of an exceptionally interested party, whose version of the relevant circumstances will typically be unchallenged by knowledgeable persons, if not simply presented ex parte. 78 The potential for systematic bias and distortions of various sorts in largely ex parte presentations with obvious and substantial information asymmetries is clear.
79
The largely ex parte nature of most deletion requests, in which the personally incentivized requester has both greater information access and strong self-interest considerations, is not the only relevant asymmetry. 80 Consider the rare deletion requests that proceed to some higher administrative or even judicial level. The majority of such requests will presumably be appeals of a denied deletion request. Lack of symmetry in taking the initiative will thus be built into the appeals system. In most cases, if no broader principle is at stake, the realistic financial incentives of the parties are likely to be asymmetric as well, especially where the requester, but not the search engine owners, seeks money damages or attorneys' fees. Information that has been publicly available on the internet is both more easily removed, and at the same time, paradoxically, often harder to entirely remove, 81 as opposed to former technologies. 82 We naturally identify and sympathize with those persons who continue to suffer the consequences of prior indiscretions, or even non-culpable acts and associations. But broad-sweeping legal rules and regimes in this area, even if they encourage some form of attempted interest balancing, are nevertheless ill-advised.
A broad interest balancing approach at least recognizes that "people's decisions about their own privacy affect society, not just themselves."
83 Ideally, though, privacy decision makers should not confine themselves to holding a mental picture of a living, breathing personal requester against a merely faceless, disembodied, unsympathetic, abstract "society." Societal interests must indeed be considered, in the best available ways. But it is also useful to at least try to think concretely and particularly of those now anonymous, faceless persons who might, at some point in the future, unfairly suffer from the unavailability, or from the availability only at a high cost, of the deleted information. 84 Nor, as alluded to above, 85 can we count on the more or less good faith judgment of those persons who are motivated to seek a deletion or delinking. We should instead expect systematic, though unintended, biases in such requests and presentations. This is not primarily a matter of conscious deception by requesters, but of familiar psychological overall tendencies and patterns in broad populations. Consider, to begin with, Nietzsche's aphorism serving as the epigram above: "'I have done that,' says my memory. 'I cannot have done that,' says my pride, and remains inexorable." 86 Alternatively, but equally relevant to our context, consider Adam Smith's observation that "[i]t is so disagreeable to think ill of ourselves that we often purposely turn away our view from those circumstances which might render that judgment unfavorable." 87 One leading contemporary privacy theorist has publicly wondered whether interest in a broad right to be forgotten "may be a sign that we are tired of confronting our past mistakes and responsibilities." 88 Contemporary social science would suggest that typically, we are not far removed from self-serving, 89 if not self-deluded, attitudes. 90 The desire, however, to erase negative elements of our public past is often more understandable than fully justified.
The tendency to be systematically biased judges in our own case seems pervasive and well-established. 91 This poses a distinctively severe problem for broad, and largely ex parte, right to be forgotten statutes and other broad privacy rules. The problem exists whether 
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or not the incidences of self-indulgence and self-absorption are worsening over time. 92 For our purposes, any form and degree of narcissism, 93 as well as any sense of personal entitlement, 94 may reinforce what is professionally known as attribution bias and an arbitrary minimization of personal responsibility. 95 Attribution bias simply refers to the idea that "[p]eople are more likely to attribute positive events to themselves but dismiss negative events as attributable to other causes." 96 Nor can people-including those seeking removal of personal information from the internet-be counted on to recognize their own self-serving biases regarding the causes, consequences, and possible continuing relevance of their prior acts. Generally, people are better at detecting self-serving attributional bias in other persons-when they have sufficient unbiased information to do so-than they are in These attributional biases thus jointly operate to systemically skew our own sense of responsibility for our own past actions. Again, the argument is not that these biases have been historically increasing. Instead, the argument is that such biases tend to outweigh any counter-biases tending in the opposing direction. If we then think of what we have done as largely externally controlled or otherwise, 99 on any imaginable theory, not fully our own responsibility, 100 we may more uninhibitedly seek removal of unfavorable information, and the stories we tell about our prior acts may also reflect these biases.
The biases energizing us to obscure unfavorable elements of our past and to shade their telling to others are linked to a superficial kind of self-forgiveness. 101 But there is also a deeper and more valuable sort of self-forgiveness that is instead linked to the appropriate acceptance of responsibility, rather than to its denial or minimization. 102 This deeper sort of self-forgiveness requires that we acknowledge and accept genuinely appropriate responsibility, rather than deny, contest, The broader public, however, also has some grounds for not casually assuming nearly universal or dramatic character change for the better as person's age. One scholar has argued: personality is . . . relatively enduring over time. In fact, the levels of consistency in personality traits are . . . higher than phenomena such as income, blood pressure, and cholesterol levels, and substantially higher than psychological ideas such as happiness and self-esteem. 108 It remains true that however small the magnitude of the change, 109 people can indeed become more responsible, more caring, and more conscientious, particularly as they enter and transition through adulthood. 110 These results accord with the popular view that adolescents may "settle down," mature, and take on responsibility as they move into and through adulthood. The social science evidence suggests that we do tend to be reasonably realistic about the likely direction of change in other people's personality over time and tend to be logical about discounting their earlier behaviors to at least some degree. 111 Finally, consider some of the most practical dimensions of the distinct further problem of paternalism. A broad, murky rule mandating a right to be forgotten of one sort or another would in a real sense count as paternalistic. 112 Of course, to the extent that such a broad right to be forgotten is intended to prevent our imposing unjust harms on other persons by our irrationally failing to discount their past actions, the rule would in that sense not count as paternalistic. In a broader sense though, a right to be forgotten is intended to affect our choices as to whom we associate with, not by providing more information, or through uncontroversial explanation of information, but by depriving us of information, or by raising our costs of obtaining information, based on official fears that we would misinterpret or attach too much weight to that assumedly true information. 113 This is not an attractive public policy path. In other speech contexts, certainly, the Supreme Court has appreciated the controversy of depriving competent adults of accurate data when making commercial and personal decisions affecting other persons.
114
One might argue to the contrary that the continuing internet accessibility, 115 of say a report of a decade-old bankruptcy liquidation, 116 amounts to misleading speech, 117 and as misleading speech, it is properly subject to official delinking or deletion, whether paternalistically or not. But it is far from clear that such a report should now count as misleading on the grounds that the debtor's circumstances or character might well have changed in the intervening decade. As we have seen, competent adults typically recognize the possibility of maturation, 118 as well as, quite obviously, of relevant change of circumstance. To refuse credit, say, to a now objectively creditworthy .edu/entries/paternalism. For an unusually forthright defense of paternalism in particular circumstances, see SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013).
113. See sources cited supra note 112. This is presumably true in the case of information that is somehow deemed to be irrelevant to our assumed purposes, or obsolete. 118. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. When all else is, or appears to be, entirely equal, some persons might systematically prefer to trust someone with no bankruptcy over someone with a stale bankruptcy experience. Persons with arguably stale adverse experiences, though, need not passively assume that all else must remain perpetually equal. To complicate person, is to leave money on the table, and to thereby invite one's competitors to take advantage of our own irrationality.
Further, an accurately dated but arguably stale bankruptcy report is clearly not misleading in the sense that, say, a carrot seller's triumphant claim that her particular carrots are cholesterol-free would be. 119 The decision makers in right to be forgotten cases will inevitably face an endless succession of assertions that a particular representation is now misleading, for whatever purposes might be imaginable or actually imagined, across the broadest range of specific circumstances. Such a succession of speculative cases would also require the decision makers to somehow classify the allegedly misleading internet speech at issue as either commercial speech or non-commercial speech, 120 assuming that misleading commercial speech can be somewhat more freely regulated than social or political speech broadly defined. 121 As it has thus far been conceived, a broad right to be forgotten involves distinctive practical problems associated with a substantial element of government paternalism. Such an argument could easily be further developed. 122 The main focus of this article, however, has instead been on the range of relevant and mutually reinforcing biases and asymmetries, and on related practical considerations more generally. Each of the reinforcing practical concerns raised above adds further pragmatic complications, particularly to the operation of any broad-sweeping, generalized right to be forgotten.
At an extreme though, even pragmatic concerns for the risks, costs, and sheer workability of any broad legal mechanism unavoidably begin to merge with fundamental relevant moral and political principles. Dystopias, in the extreme case, may manifest as systematic and mutually reinforcing biases, severe asymmetries of information and motivation, and policy distortions and inefficiencies. Any such political or moral concern may seem irrelevant if we simplistically think of a right to be forgotten as the merely straightforward universal empowerment of individuals, and perhaps of small groups. 123 But for every individual who is empowered by a legally enforced cleaning of the personal internet slate, many other individuals, disproportionately those who cannot easily afford the most productive internet searches, 124 may lose realistic access to usable information without their knowledge or consent.
One might argue in response that the lost information was authoritatively deemed to be outdated or irrelevant, 125 at least for such purposes as the relevant decision maker was able to envision. It is unnecessary to reiterate the systematic biases and asymmetries that predictably tend to distort such determinations. Rather, the primary concern is that determining which items of information should be widely accessible is made not by an empowered individual, but, ultimately, by a government or a court that sets the criteria for search engine corporations and other private actors to follow. It is certainly worth considering society's comfort with a for-profit entity like Google making discretionary public policy decisions. However, if the corporate decision rules are ultimately set in general terms by governments, it is unclear that individual persons are thereby distinctly empowered.
In the end, it is certainly understandable that contemporary Europeans in particular, given the history of the twentieth century, would be especially anxious about personal privacy. 126 But it is far from clear why the best response to nightmarish historic centralized governmental abuse of privacy is to entrust decisions as to the relevance and 123. Whether and how any broad personal right to be forgotten should be extended to groups, large or small, and to various sorts of corporate entities, will be left to defenders of such a right.
124. significance of information, in unforeseen contexts, to a few multinationals, and ultimately to centralized governments. 127 It seems more reasonable to entrust such decisions to the various people who may be affected, positively or negatively, by how sensibly they respond to and discount the information in question. 128 The exercise of discretionary authority to grant or withhold access to information, whether by one or more international profit-seeking entities or by centralized governments, where it is not systematically skewed as described above, may well tend to track the perceived interests of that decision maker. Those interests may not correspond to the interests of affected individuals or the broader public.
129

CONCLUSION
The idea of a broad-sweeping right to be forgotten, in whatever form it is proposed, inevitably raises fundamental questions. It is tempting to try to make sound, broad legal policy by somehow pitting the value of informational privacy, however defined, against an equally vague and general right of access to information itself. A debate at that level of competing abstract rights, however, distorts the issues without encouraging genuine progress in understanding.
The approach taken in this Article has focused on the systematic and mutually reinforcing patterns of biases and asymmetries likely, in practice, to distort, in predictable ways, the practical operation of any version of a generalized right to be forgotten. Some of the crucial biases and asymmetries reflect familiar psychologies, cognitive limits, incentives, and patterns of interests of persons and institutions, as recognized in common experience and supported by the available social science evidence. On this basis, this Article has instead recommended a range of better understood, fine-tuned, particularized, and more contextualized common law and statutory privacy-oriented remedies, as continually amended in the interests of socio-economic fairness and equality. Given this more attractive alternative path, a broadly generalized right to be forgotten should be subject to a recall.
